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Abstract. In this commentary, I reply to the fourteen papers published in the Sign 
Systems Studies special issue on Peirce’s Th eory of Signs, with a view on connecting 
some of their central themes and theses and in putting some of the key points in those 
papers into a wider perspective of Peirce’s logic and philosophy. 
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My commentary proceeds in the order in which the papers appear in the special issue 
of Sign Systems Studies on Peirce’s Th eory of Signs.1 
Francesco Bellucci’s paper “Exploring Peirce’s speculative grammar: The 
immediate object of a sign” puts forward a closely argued thesis that only propositions 
have immediate objects. Th is apt fi nding is a welcome reminder of some of the crucial 
elements concerning Peirce’s theory of signs, worth recapitulating and putting into 
a wider perspective. One of them is not to confuse the objectual and the meaning 
categories of signs. Th e other is the futility of attempting to interpret theories that 
Peirce came to develop, drawing on other thinkers whose ultimate presuppositions 
Peirce would not and could not have shared. Here the soi-disant Fregean interpretation 
of Peirce’s theory has sometimes been put forth to the eff ect that signs have (dynamic) 
1 Most papers of the current special issue have originated with the events organized or co-
organized by the guest editor of this volume, in  2014–2015, including the 2nd Applying Peirce 
Conference in Talsinki on Peirce’s centennial in April 2014 and the Workshop on Icon at the 
University of Helsinki in September 2014 (see also Pietarinen 2014). Several Metaphysical 
Club meetings were held at Helsinki and Tallinn in 2014–2015, and two panels during the 
14th International Congress on Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science in Helsinki, 
August 2015 (“Pragmaticist philosophy of science: Old and new”; “Tracking the recent turn in 
philosophy of notation”).
Th e transcription of Peirce’s unpublished work on divisions of signs that I have included 
can be read as an answer by the author himself to some further issues raised in the individual 
papers.
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objects in the sense of the Bedeutung, indeed typically translated as the reference of 
the sign. It is the immediate objects, the story goes, that are what Frege has in mind 
when he uses the term Sinn. One need not look further than Peirce’s own comments, 
where statements on signs “referring” to their objects are few and far between. Signs 
represent, indicate, resemble, are determined by, and so on, but they do not refer. 
References to ‘reference’ are much more common in Peirce’s corpus as soon as he 
starts to examine assertions in connection to their universes of discourse, ranges of 
possibilities, states of aff airs, states of information and so on. Can the rebuttal of the 
Fregean interpretation get any more explicit than that?
Far from implying a Saussurean or Derridean hermetically closed system of 
signifi cation, the consistent use of ‘representation’ instead of ‘reference’ in relation to 
objectual categories does not off er comfort to Fregean interpretations with respect 
to the meaning of fi ction, either. Th e reason why Frege gets into such troubles with 
fi ctional characters – and why later interpreters have got into even deeper waters 
in trying to understand objects of fi ction within the narrowly conceived Fregean 
framework of abstract objects (witness e.g. the ‘Julius Caesar problem’ in the philosophy 
of mathematics)2 – is that Frege thinks that in asserting something one is compelled 
to quantify across one big domain of logical thought. Peirce, in contrast, takes the 
view agreed to by contemporary literary scholars, namely that in producing fi ction 
one is at once making a semantic gesture towards a creation of domains of fi ction over 
which the relevant discourse is understood to run. 
One need not even enter the realm of fi ction to observe similar phenomena, as it is 
well understood in contemporary theories of discourse, e.g. discourse representation 
theory, that it is in the nature of discourse, and in the common ground shared by 
the speakers and interpreters, that new objects, such as discourse referents, come to 
be created and represented by the discourse, much like that lekta of the Stoics might 
have been.
But what exactly is an immediate object, as an object of a proposition? Propositions 
have complex structures and potentially many candidates can claim the status of those 
objects “as the sign represents them”. Here I feel we can go even further than Bellucci and 
argue explicitly that the true logical home of immediate objects is the quantifi ers or, more 
generally speaking, the determiners, demonstratives, modals, and so on. Immediate 
objects determine signs that are propositions, which themselves denote or have dynamic 
objects as values of the variables that those immediate objects quantify over.
2 Th e Fregean problem is to have a theory that uniquely identifi es natural numbers as objects 
by their identities not only with all natural-number objects but also with all non-mathematical 
objects, including Julius Caesar, that would avoid Julius Caesar being among the objects of 
natural numbers. Th e problem does not arise in Peirce’s philosophy of mathematics (Pietarinen 
2010b), since natural number terms do not refer to abstract objects: it is the dynamic object 
that determines the sign of the natural number, and those signs give rise to their interpretants 
as non-trivial applications of arithmetic.
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Th e hypothesis that immediate objects are quantifi ers and quantifi ed variables 
conforms well to Peirce’s later development of his theory of logic and game-theoretic 
semantics as an interpretation of his logic. In game-theoretic semantics, the players 
pick elements from the domain of discourse to serve as the values of the variables. 
Generally, one can think of such interpretations as substitutional or objectual. In 
the former case, the players give names to the elements (or dynamic objects, if you 
will) of the domain and substitute the variables with those names. In the latter, it is 
the elements of the domain that are the values. I have argued elsewhere that Peirce 
understood the interpretation of quantifi ers objectually, and that this is attested in 
his pragmatic theory of proper names (Pietarinen 2010a). Now my interpretation 
gets further support from Peirce’s 1904 theory of signs, as it is only the objectual 
interpretation that in the end not only is consistent with the immediate/dynamic 
distinction but presupposes it. In substitutional interpretation, the names are the 
dynamic objects, and since names ordinarily denote some thing they are the names 
of, one is led to an impossible situation, as dynamic objects do not denote any further 
thing: there are no ‘fi nal objects’ or Dinge an sich in Peirce’s account.
Maybe this game-theoretic interpretation of propositions, which Peirce indeed 
developed in detail and with an uncanny proximity to its contemporary version,3 
also serves to alleviate the worries Helmut Pape has concerning Bellucci’s argument. 
Pape calls for such a notion of an immediate object that would capture the “cognitive 
paths and conditions” that enable us to determine the correct interpretation of those 
propositions. Now the matter of correct interpretations is the matter of the existence 
of winning strategies for those players who set out to verify or falsify the propositions, 
in so far as non-vague and non-general propositions are concerned. (One might want 
to entertain triadic logic and undetermined truth-values for indefi nite propositions, 
which serves the point just as well.) Such existence is an objective feature of the models 
in question. But to act according to such strategies calls for reasoning which surely 
is not devoid of cognitive value. Goal-directed strategic interactions concern general 
tendencies to act in certain ways in certain kinds of circumstances when exposed to 
qualities, resemblances and recognitions of various kinds. Th e immediate objects of 
propositions provide the precepts which guide the players in their task of seeking 
and fi nding the suitable dynamic objects from the domains of discourse to serve as 
values of those immediate objects. Th e domains need not be limited to elementary 
and extensional ones as they can be intensional, modal, temporal, higher-order, 
results of abstractions (possessing ‘blueness’), and so on. A useful way of looking at 
immediate objects as precepts that serve as an aid to interpretation and not merely 
as inactive formal elements of propositions of speculative grammar is to conceive 
of them in their diagrammatic forms, especially as the theory of existential graphs 
3 See Pietarinen 2006b, 2007. Peirce's rule to interpret “Any man will die” quoted by Pape is 
virtually identical to that of Jaakko Hintikka's game-theoretic semantics.
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represents them. Th ose diagrammatic forms are instructions that tell the players 
how they are to go about playing the semantic games. What makes this semantic or 
semiotic interpretation of propositions and assertions ultimately a matter of speculative 
rhetoric, and thus satisfy Pape’s wish, is articulated by the interactive structure of 
diagrammatic propositions and ultimately realized by considering the nature of those 
strategies as habits of action that we fi nd in interactive structures.
It is clear that Pape’s own conception of the dynamic object in “Peirce on the 
dynamic object of a sign: From ontology and semiotics and back” is not quite the 
one that Bellucci endorses, which roughly is the denotation of immediate objects. 
In contrast, Pape maintains that the structure of a process ontology and dynamic 
semiotics is inferential, and that the dynamic object emerges as a functional role in 
the model of those inferential processes. According to Pape, all completely realized, 
or should one say rational, sign processes have a property of transitivity. One cannot 
deny the fundamental importance of transitivity, as Stjernfelt’s note on the nota notae 
(see below) also points out. Yet many processes and inferential and rational pathways 
appear to fail to meet the requirement. Similarity is not a transitive relation, and 
neither is preference, parenthood or the relation of relevance. Icon A that resembles 
Icon B that resembles Icon C need not resemble C. Th at seems to scrap large parts 
of sign classes and sign actions right there from the domain of transitive inferences. 
Perhaps one might want to argue that in these cases one simply is not performing fully 
rational acts, or that the observations of such counterexamples are highly empirical, 
but what they really seem to point out is that we might want to have a model of semiosis 
that helps us understand also non-transitive and not only either ideally rational or 
exclusively empirical phenomena.
But is not the existence of non-transitive sign processes only a welcome thing 
in semiosis? Th ere is an element of spooky functionalism if all there is to dynamic 
objects is that they are emergent features or functional roles in an inferential structure 
of a signifi cation process. In fact, Pape’s argument comes dangerously close not only 
to functionalism but also computationalism (if those sign processes were given a 
computational description) and even constructivism, as Pape himself seems to be 
willing to accept. I think Peirce’s scholastic realism quickly discounts any constructivist 
pitch. Th e fundamental problem of functionalism is that if all there is to a sign’s 
signifi cation is that it performs or computes suitable functions, and that cognitive or 
mental states thus emerge from suitable confi gurations of (computable) functions, 
then anything in which those functions can be realized can manifest signifi cation. My 
socks and gloves, right here and right now, on my both feet and hands, would exhibit 
such semiotic functions and construct dynamic objects as the result of those processes.
I can anticipate a reply: that similarity, preference, relevance or whatever non-
transitive relations there may be, are vague relations and not genuinely but only 
degeneratively triadic or dyadic relations. Th ey would lack the third, the branch 
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in the relation of teridentity, which Peirce once aptly termed “indefi nitely multiple 
identity” (MS 490; Pietarinen 2015b). Th at branch caters for relations with modes 
of identifi cation that interpret identities. Likewise, similarity of signs and objects 
is similarity in certain respect, just as preferential orders and measures of relevant 
meanings are. Th ey are highly contextual, but stating so is a truism. It does not make 
the matter of similarity or identity of objects overly epistemological. Game-theoretic 
semantics also proves the point. Once dynamic objects are picked in the semantic 
game to serve as values of immediate objects, making the right or good choices has 
the eff ect of satisfying the propositions and ascertaining their truth or falsity in a 
given model. Which values propositions have depends on whether and for whom in 
the semantic games between the utterer and the interpreter the stable habits of action 
(winning strategies) obtain. Yet the identity of such habits does not depend on whether 
the players know what these strategies are (Pietarinen 2007). Strategies either exist in 
relation to the models or they do not. A game either has certain well-defi ned solution 
concepts or it does not. A quantifi er that prompts the selection binds the elements in 
the domain of discourse in a certain manner, but those elements are real elements of 
the structure of that domain quite independently of what we happen to know about 
the identity of habits or what we come to assert by propositions that contain such 
quantifi ers and other logical devices.4 Take knowing wh-statements as an example. I 
can know who someone is by re-identifi cation, by pointing, or observing a portrait of 
a person, and I can know him or her by identifying his or her public status or fi nding 
out his or her social security number. In either case, that individual is a dynamic object 
quite independently of the particular modes of identifi cation that I might resort to in 
my attempt of answering knowing wh-questions. 
While I agree with Bellucci’s comment that the apparent contradiction between 
the sign-independence of objects and our understanding of objects depending on 
inferential structures of semiosis is only apparent, the particular example of Pape’s, the 
utterance of “Th is is a wonderful night”, is actually a bit more complex, as the very act 
of uttering that sentence contributes to what the nature of the state of aff airs is. Th at 
is, one has to take into account the illocutionary nature of the utterance: refrain from 
uttering it at the right moment in the presence of your loved one and suddenly the night 
might not turn out to be quite as wonderful as it could have been aft er all. Logically, 
this is no big deal, since such eff ects that the uttering of the sentence introduce may 
well be parts of the model of the propositions. In other words, sentences and signs can 
4 See Pietarinen 2007. A further consequence is that the diff erences between the semantic 
and the pragmatic approaches to meaning appear insignifi cant from the game-theoretic 
standpoint, just as Peirce’s trivium was presented to be: that which is semantic and that which is 
pragmatic cannot be distinguished by the rule-governed features of game theory. Th e diff erence 
is whether the players know the content of the solution concepts and strategy profi les in the 
game-theoretic analysis; an epistemic addition turns on pragmatic elements of uses of signs.
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very well serve as their own models. Counting signs among the elements of the models 
of which they are the signs is not only a conceivable and consistent deed in semantic 
theories, but something quite oft en appealed to in complex representational tasks.
Th ere is, however, a further problem in assuming the universality of transitive 
processes to govern the identity of dynamic objects. Look at Pape’s Principle of Object 
Identity. One cannot help feeling that Pape is attempting to construct the identity of 
dynamic objects out of the sign triads, a construction internal to the inferential relations 
between signs. What is an identity relation represented to obtain between two objects, 
and what is a sign relation connecting two signs? Peirce’s signs are representations of 
objects with respect to the interpretants that they produce. Now suppose, charitably, 
that there were such sign relations connecting signs, perhaps given by acquaintance, 
common ground and collateral information. Note that those identities and sign relations 
are presupposed by the process of semiosis, as the example of the fi re in Megara that also 
Houser discusses in his paper (see below) makes evident. Pape thinks that a sign-relation 
is “connected to a possibly unlimited sequence of interpretations”, but interpretations 
are not unlimited: there is a crucial diff erence between diff erent kinds of interpretations, 
especially those given either by immediate or representative interpretants. While the 
former could somehow be thought of as a sign that shares its object with the object of 
the previous sign triad, the latter is an entirely diff erent kind of an interpretant that, 
as a sign, tells us how the previous sign is related to its object. As soon as it does that, a 
habit-taking tendency takes over and the process comes to a halt. For the purposes of 
signifi cation, dynamic objects hang out much better with those other, non-immediate 
interpretants than with immediate interpretants. 
A further problem is that if Pape’s presumed triadic, transitive inferential process is 
something that could in fact capture the representations of identity relations (again, this 
is a charitable reading, since it is not clear at all what those relations could be), then the 
objects in the sequence of triads in which the interpretant of the previous sign becomes 
or is connected to the sign which interprets the previous sign, are the same. Th ey can 
be identifi ed as such, so far as Pape’s defi nition goes, since there is “an independent 
second sign-relation” for which the identity relation holds. But since Pape has left  the 
other varieties of intepretants besides immediate interpretants out of the picture, aft er 
four applications of the intepretants being “connected by the sign relation” to a further 
sign, and aft er having ascertained ourselves of the existence of fi ve identities between 
objects that we get from working backwards from the last “sign-relation connection” to 
the fi rst, we have come to connect the interpretant of the fi ft h triad to the representamen 
of the original triad. Th at is a cycle, a simple group of triads. Semiosis becomes a trivial, 
primitively recursive closed system, with identical objects concentrated at the centre 
of that structure that looks like a carambola slice. Something has gone terribly wrong.
Should we not conclude that triadic sign relations and transitive inferential relations 
ought not to be too closely assimilated? Should we not conclude that semiosis is an 
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open system, where information external to signs matters as to its representational 
capacities? Should we not conclude that there are facts of the matter, such as structures 
of the models and the universes of discourse of those models, that have the power to 
make representations true or false? 
To avoid unnecessary rejoinders, I am not arguing against transitivity of teridentity. 
Transitivity of teridentity is another, remarkable property which in its generalized 
form, in which sign relations embody relational generality (a higher type of generality 
generalizing all possibilities) gives rise to the structure of continuum. 
Th e processual nature of semiosis that Pape emphasizes in his paper is also the topic 
of Juuso-Ville Gustafsson’s “Triadism and processuality”. Gustafsson’s paper examines 
the close affi  nity of Peirce’s triadism and the process philosophy of Nicholas Rescher. 
Does the irreducibility of processes presuppose irreducibility of the triadic nature of 
signs? Gustafsson argues that accepting triads in one’s semiotics leads to accepting 
process metaphysics. Th e correct notion of metaphysics in semiotics is, therefore, to 
consider the ontology of signs from the point of view of process metaphysics. Are we 
compelled to accept triads in semiotics as indecomposable and irreducible elements? 
Th e negative version of the irreducibility of triads has been discussed at length in 
the literature (see e.g. Houser et al. 1997). As a theorem of systems of topology or a 
well-formulated logic of graphs its validity is incontestable: there is no way a genuine 
relation of teridentity, with a point of teridentity as a graph expressing that relation in 
it, can be conjured up from zero, one and two-place relations alone. Identities between 
two are simple identities; between three they are genuine identities. Such teridentity is 
a graph-theoretic concept of a real identity between three relata that consists of a spot 
reduced into a dot of teridentity upon which three lines of identities meet at their ends.
Th ese fundamental valency considerations are the fi rst considerations to be had 
in Peirce’s doctrine of categories, the cenopythagorean categories. If every element of 
the phaneron was a monad or a dyad, no triad could ever be constituted from them. 
Elementary concepts are irreducible, and those are the triads, or more accurately 
speaking the relations of teridentities, and even more accurately speaking, graphs of 
“indefi nitely multiple identity” (MS 490; Pietarinen 2015b).
If so, there is no process metaphysical consideration reaching further beyond the 
valental analysis of the basic categories. Th ose processual notions must presuppose 
the triads, and not the other way around, just as Gustafsson argues in his paper. 
Metaphysics is the last philosophy, and whatever is discovered in mathematics, 
phaneroscopy or logical analysis must precede its fi ndings. 
To what kind of action or process does the triadic sign give rise? Pape’s view is 
that the relations between sign triads are inferential, and presuppose transitivity. 
According to Gustafsson, the sign triad is a functional unity. Since function is action, 
signs could be characterized as triadic processes. Does it make sense to ask what 
further ontological commitments are there in functional unity as a process? Does 
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semiotics need an ontological framework to be complete? Is a Rescher-style process 
metaphysics that takes substances or objects constituted by actions and processes of 
any help here? I cannot help feeling that claims made on behalf of irreducible process 
metaphysics are more narrowly construed than those concerning the irreducibility 
of the sign triad, as the former assigns metaphysical status to processes by virtue 
of existence claims. Anything Rescher’s process ontology claims is translatable into 
Peirce’s semiotics: owned vs. unowned processes are distinctions between the actual 
presence of utterers and interpreters for objects and interpretants vs. the would-be 
interpretations, just to give an example of how such a translation would go. Signs 
represent reality, and no additional ontological duplication of those representations 
of relation appears compelling. 
Moreover, signs are linked to interpreting quasi-minds without which they could 
not do the job they are supposed to do. Th is connection is not obviously there in either 
Rescher’s conceptual or ontological process worlds. Signs are “owned” by minds, to 
twist Peirce’s terminology. Yet minds are also processes: they are “sign-creatories” 
connected to “reasoning-machines”, as Peirce once put it. Nothing precludes taking 
the notions of the minds, utterers and interpreters also as processes.
With all its cash value in the light of contemporary sciences that tend to theorize 
everything in terms of processes, action and interaction, fi elds, forces and occurrences, 
process ontology is an aft erthought. Th ere are no genuine, non-degenerate processes 
without sign triads. Material and physical things that make existence or occurrence 
claims are conceived through degenerate triadic and dyadic processes. Lacking life, 
purpose and meaning, physical and non-biological processes can well be counted as 
processes but they are not triads. 
Pan-semiotics is not a view of contemporary biosemiotics, as well argued in Terrence 
Deacon’s works. Without delving into the details of Deacon’s arguments on the human/
animal symbol use and the co-evolution of language, mind, cognition, brain, culture 
and society, let me remark on a couple of points in Tyler James Bennett’s exposition of 
Deacon’s views in “Memes are not signs: Th e Symbolic Species and the semiotic life cycle”. 
It would require additional arguments to be convinced that the chimp experiments 
demonstrate signifi cant diff erences between infant human and animal behaviour 
and their diff erences between decisions in presence of various stimuli. Many other 
experiments demonstrate that also human beings are more liable to discount the future, 
even hyperbolically so, when the promised rewards (money, naturally, for human beings) 
are visibly on the table. If it is easier for chimps to arrive at rational decisions when the 
rewards are concealed and merely encoded in some way, it is equally so for human 
beings. A minor point is that the encoding given in numerals or similar signs directly 
connected to their rewards is an indexical rather than a symbolic form of encoding. 
Another of Deacon’s points is that symbols that spread in cultures come with specifi c 
disadvantages: an example is self-replication or “memetic” propagation of symbols that 
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dissociates symbols from the communities who by default are expected to cultivate them 
by ever-improving critical interpretations of their meanings. Maybe such a phenomenon 
of brainless self-replication takes place in dogmatic belief formations that, when passing 
unchecked, result in atrocities and pseudo-science. Still, I fail to see how it could follow 
that self-replication or memetic copying, with or without support of a broken analogy 
from genetics, would turn dead symbols or monotonous mantras into zombie-like 
pseudo-signs or non-signs. Th e relevant distinction is that of types and tokens of signs, 
not between living and dead ones. 
Another misplaced analogy is nevertheless identifi ed by Bennett in his criticism of 
Winfried Nöth’s semi-literal association of legisigns with living things. Nöth claims 
that legisigns are more similar to life than dissimilar to it. If I am more similar to 
my male colleagues than to my sister-in-law, does that mean that the concept of my 
extended family ought to be relocated to my departmental chair? Aren’t crystals in 
so many ways more living than colloids, as Joseph Wood Krutch masterfully essayed? 
Symbols grow, but so do buildings, balloons and red giants. A perfect replicator 
dynamics would have to replicate the entire context, physical, cognitive and temporal, 
of the sign for it ever to degenerate into a non-signifying non-sign. A-brain-in-a-
vat thought experiment with endlessly iterating simulations of its laboratory context 
strikes me as a toy experiment compared to that possibility.
A few further clarifi cations concerning Bennett’s paper may be in order. Although 
‘unlimited semiosis’ may have become a common statement among semioticians, it 
was never a household notion in Peirce’s works. Generation of interpretants ceases 
as soon as one reaches the fi nal (or ultimate, logical, eventual or representative, pick 
your favourite) interpretant, as those amount to the tendency to take habits. Habits of 
actions are not signs: a habit of a habit is that habit itself (on this point, see Bellucci, 
Pietarinen in press a, and the paper by Stjernfelt in this issue). Bennett asks what the 
missing third, the ‘fi nal object’ would consist of, were it to exist. Bellucci’s and Pape’s 
papers already exhausted the objectual divisions: as to the absent third, even the idea 
of what the fi nal object could be like cannot be made coherent or comprehensible. 
It is not even an entity that could be hypothetically contemplated: hypotheticals, 
counterfactuals, real possibilities etc. are of course Peirce’s tools of trade that do not 
exist, but for that very reason ascertain the reality of the sign triads. In contrast, an 
absolutely context-independent object identical across all possible worlds is no better 
than a God or an Allah or 72 Virgins – simple confusions of thought that promise 
but an eternal freeze. Reality and fi ction would be indistinguishable, and we would 
all be living in a computer simulation, which itself is a simulation.
Mere replication is a poor dynamics in co-evolutionary processes. Th e really 
interesting things start to emerge when learning begins to guide evolution. No biologist 
contests the reality of the Baldwin eff ect – more accurately termed the Peirce–Baldwin 
eff ect (Pietarinen 2011a) – and much new is learned every day about how information 
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in the environment becomes a genetically inherited trait.5 Th e crucial thing is that it 
is the tendencies to learn that become inheritable: not the task itself, but the Peircean 
habit epigenetically projaculated to off spring.
Much of the confusion around Deacon’s appropriation of Peirce could have been 
avoided by Deacon’s early adoption of habits of action as the cornerstone of his co-
evolutionary accounts of meaning, symbols and legisigns; an omission in Th e Symbolic 
Species I have pointed out earlier (Pietarinen 2012). His 2012 sequel, Incomplete Nature, 
nevertheless follows the recommendation and takes up the theme of habits, if only as 
a ‘constraint’. Th at concept, however, weakens the Peircean claim. For Peirce, habit is 
not a negative constraint, but an increase in the degrees of freedom. It is precisely in 
the habits of action that one fi nds a new beginning: life thrives when there is stability, 
homeostasis, evolutionary stable equilibria. As every complexity theorist knows, 
stability emerges from diversity and decentralized processes. Take also that habits 
are not signs. Yet if memes were only those collapsed, mechanized and algorithmic 
forms automata and replicator dynamics produce, they surely could not be associated 
with Peircean habits. Bennett’s central claim is that memes are not signs either, but this 
poses a problem as they have little else to escape into. Is there any niche for memes-not-
signs in Peirce’s theory? I do not see there is, and I hold out hopes for constructing one.
What entitled Peirce to make such high claims on behalf of his least explored 
part of the method of semiotics, the speculative rhetoric? Pape already noted in his 
contribution that a comprehensive theory of propositions should not overlook that 
important edifi ce of Peirce’s theory of signs. Here I feel that we can get a better grasp 
of Peirce’s overall ideas and intentions not by an exegetic reading of his own texts but 
by putting his incomplete suggestions and emerging insights into a novel perspective, 
and by pushing his ideas further than he was able to do and by relating them to some 
contemporary and much later inventions. Th e ground that Peirce prepared is well 
suited for making such one-and-the-half truths concerning his preliminary ideas. 
For example, it is remarkable how well Peirce understood the nature of science, which 
continues to surprise as his views surpass so much of the 20th-century philosophy of 
science. Being in a living touch with the late 19th-century sciences must have done 
a world of good to anyone’s philosophical thinking. In a passage quoted by Mats 
Bergman in “Th e highest branch of logic? On a neglected question of speculative 
rhetoric”, Peirce expounds science as a “living process” that is not suffi  ciently 
explained by attempts to fi nd general conditions of the truth of its representations. 
Here Peirce disvalues the much later attempts to defi ne truth-conditional semantics 
for the statements of scientifi c theories. To really philosophize about science, Peirce 
continues, it is “necessary further to study the laws of the development of scientifi c 
5 And so information is obviously observer-relative as Searle has consistently argued 
throughout his life, while the Floridi–Bostrom accounts can only speak about its degenerate 
form, the context-free and observer-free, non-biological dyad.
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representations”. Such study belongs to the purview of speculative rhetoric. Here it 
is easy to nod at various practice-based approaches to the philosophy of science that 
have emerged of late, including the work on modelling and computational simulations 
as examples of those practices that are not directly involved in fi nding out the truths 
of scientifi c models and representations. What is equally remarkable besides such 
contemporary acquaintances is that it is logic that Peirce thought to be the right 
method of study in any philosophy of science in practice. Practices are no exclusive 
territory of sociological, socio-psychological or anthropological fi eld studies; they 
recommend a logical approach by means of which to discover the laws of scientifi c 
representations and the general use of signs involved in those representations.
For example, the study of notations pertains to speculative rhetoric. As any 
creative scientist is ready to acknowledge, improvements in notation are the key to 
novel discoveries. Every truly important step in mathematics, for example, has been 
a step in the improvement of notation. And it is the task of logic to study the nature 
and character of notation, including notation for the very language of logic itself. 
Th is explains why Peirce was led to exclaim that a “colossal doctrine” awaits us in 
the apparently narrow context of logical algebras: the thought of a colossal doctrine 
occurred to him while he was reviewing Schröder’s work on the algebra of logic which 
Peirce felt Schröder had partly taken from him. What justifi es such a high estimate of 
the fi eld that was still in its infancy? One answer could be that overcoming the loose 
and ultimately harmful use of notation in logic avoids one falling back on universalist 
presuppositions about meaning. Th us the investment in notation pays back in the 
“many-worlds” viewpoint and methodological pluralism: the universalist “one-world” 
logic would, in contrast, be impotent in theorizing about how languages and notations 
link to the world and how those links could vary with new interpretations and new 
notations. Th us Schröder in Peirce’s view ultimately closes the path to logical inquiry 
in his overly formalist approach that introduces a superfl uity of logical signs,6 and for 
those reasons succeeds neither in logical analysis nor in such “broader applications” 
of logic which Peirce was about to develop in his new logic of graphs, the theory of 
signs, and speculative rhetoric. His discoveries came to be precursors of modern model 
theory and the theories of relevance, speech acts, Gricean logic of conversation, and 
the related semantic, pragmatic and cognitive theories of assertions, in some cases 
even exceeding the conceptual thinking behind these later developments.7
6 “While that ‘Algebra of Dyadic Relations’ with which Schröder fell so in love was obliged 
to provide four fundamental symbols of operation to account for the composition of concepts 
by non-relative aggregation, by non-relative multiplication, by relative aggregation, and by 
relative multiplication, the System of Existential Graphs includes all of these under the sole 
mode of composition it recognizes, – and without any special symbol; with but the ligature” 
(Charles Peirce to William James, February 26, 1909).
7 See e.g. Pietarinen 2005a; Pietarinen, Bellucci in press.
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Th ere is a lot more that is fresh and provoking in Peirce’s comments on speculative 
rhetoric. In a very unambiguous sense speculative rhetoric is the fi rst, starting point 
of inquiry. One has to begin inquiry with some vague ideas of meanings not yet 
regimented in the system of grammar or critics. A parallel case is that arguments, 
as perhaps the most complicated of sign classes, are the real backbone of scientifi c 
progress. In non-experimental sciences, which there are many even in natural sciences, 
arguments may be all that one has. Moreover, a scientist seldom makes a leap with the 
evidence already in his or her possession. To make an abductive guess, one needs to 
look for alternative and collateral sources of evidence. When the data already acquired 
has been analysed and exhausted, and when the old facts have run out, new sources 
of information are called for in order for the new and surprising facts to be observed 
and inspected. Here the resources of rhetoric prove to be of utmost value. One can 
use its resources to look at old data from new points of view, to devise new notations 
to gain those perspectives, and to interpret sparse and anecdotal data if nothing else 
seems forthcoming. All these are applications of logic, conceived in the wide sense 
of transferable skills that hone our scientifi c intellect and sensitivity, strive to make 
complex meanings communicable, enable progress where progress seems unattainable, 
and prepare one for the inevitable abductive leaps that need to be taken before long. It 
is no trivial task to have others to share your scientifi c thoughts and ideas and improve 
upon them, including the future self of your own thinking, let alone the communities 
of not-quite-like-minded scientists or the ordinary folks one wishes to source for some 
extra grains of mob intelligence. Speculative rhetoric is the indispensable force behind 
creating the innovation ecosystems that currently are so much in demand, where the 
minds are rightly nurtured, ideas grow and fl ourish, and hedges and obstacles for 
their transmission and communication are kept minimal.
Here is an example of how Peirce might have thought about the curious interplay 
between rhetorical elements and grammar and critics of logic. Th e example concerns 
the interpretation of lines of identity in his theory of existential graphs:
If a Line of Identity does not abut upon a Cut, then that extremity of it from which 
the motion of the Graphist’s pencil starts will be its hinder end, while the extremity 
at which the motion ceases will be the forward end. But since the Interpreter is at 
liberty to take it the other way, it would be a grave logical fault to add any barb or 
other mark to show which way the line faced, because it would be introducing a 
rhetorical element into what is designed to be a purely logical diagram. (MS 293, 
1906–1907, PAP)
Peirce appears to think that denoting the direction of the lines is not purely a 
grammatical or logical but a rhetorical element, and that such an extra notation should 
be avoided in the language of graphs. Th e matter is clearly so as soon as there are 
cuts in the graphs, since the interplay between the nested system of cuts and the lines 
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defi nes the direction of interpretation in graphs, namely their endoporeutic, outside-
in direction. If there are no cuts, then what the direction of the lines is is to be left  to 
the theoretical agents of the Grapheus and Graphist to decide (Pietarinen 2013), as the 
direction does not matter to the signifi cation of that line. Indeed in all the examples 
that Peirce gives of his existential graphs – which may top 10,000 tokens – he draws 
the lines without direction – in all but one, that is. In MS 430 (see Pietarinen 2015a) 
he entertains the possibility that one needs to mark a nodule or a barb at one of the 
ends of the line to denote the direction of interpretation, or rather to reverse the 
default, endoporeutic direction. But why is such a reversal needed? Th e truth is that 
there are meanings that are not elementary, namely not expressible in the standard 
fi rst-order logic or in the Beta part of existential graphs. Th e point is not to capture 
intensions, modalities or higher-order notions of abstractions. Th e point is to capture, 
using only the extensional signs of fi rst-order logic (the signs of Beta graphs) such 
meanings that at fi rst sight seem to defy such expression; meanings that are between 
the fi rst and second-order representations. Th is is surprising. Without going into the 
details of what these meanings are or were suggested by Peirce to be,8 the lesson is that 
one cannot fi x beforehand what pertains to rhetoric and what to critic or grammar. 
Rhetoric suggests that there are new meanings, and preliminarily proposes possible 
new signs to express them. At this point it is not yet clear whether such new signs are 
really needed, such as adding a barb or a nodule on the line to reverse its direction of 
interpretation. However, later it turns out that they might be needed aft er all, and that 
the new notation in question was not merely a rhetorical device but one that matters 
to the analyticity, expressivity and truth.
A lot more should be said on what kinds of factors there are that render signs 
eff ective and what the subsequent research has suggested them to be. Pragmatics 
proposes some cases in point, as do those areas of cognitive sciences and related 
fi elds that seek to understand mental-to-mental causation and the eff ects from mind 
to mind. In this, emotions and feelings may be unavoidable. But are they altogether 
dispensable  in inferences and in scientifi c work, as one oft en hears to be asserted?
Few scientists would deny feelings playing an important initial role in lift ing 
inquiry off  the ground. When Richard Feynman was about to make a guess on a 
diffi  cult problem in physics he would immediately feel seven other rival possibilities 
that could also be guessed. How to choose the right ones to be pursued as those 
abductive hypotheses that could be submitted to test? Feelings and temptations might 
have to be resisted in the right way, too. Th e early stages of a truly novel inquiry 
are full of uncertainty and noise. Jean-Marie Chevalier, in “Th e role of emotional 
interpretants in Peirce’s theory of belief and doubt” sees feelings as reasons to believe 
in a proposition as it is those feelings that give rise to the calm state of non-doubt 
8 See Pietarinen 2004a and 2015a for some explanations, and MS 504 (Peripatetic Talks No. 
6) and MS 430, to appear in Logic of the Future. 
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that inquirers strive to attain. Chevalier seeks support for such scientifi c or epistemic 
emotivism in Peirce’s theory of emotional interpretants.
Th e attempt appears to fl y in the face of Peirce’s own remarks, who opposed 
resorting to any deceitful “feeling of logicality” in reasoning and rational inquiry. It 
is not feelings that cause doubt to vanish, but the successful following of the logic of 
the scientifi c method. Whatever emotions there may be are at best epiphenomena of 
that success. Peirce moreover states that beliefs have no place in science. Scientists do 
not believe in their conditional propositions, they hope that what they have guessed 
or conjectured would turn out to be the case in the distant future (Ma, Pietarinen in 
press). Th ose conjectures do not have the luxury of reaching the status of beliefs, at 
least not in the lifetimes of any single person, project, or a research team. Entertaining 
hypotheses and moving from one to another is not to attribute beliefs in them. Th ere 
is little room for belief in science, and scientists would be very disappointed if they 
had to accept something even stronger, such as knowledge.
True, in Peirce’s actual experimental scientifi c work and in his remarks on his 
work feelings and emotional interpretants have a marked and even an evidential 
role to play. Confi dence levels and derivations of critical signifi cance parameters are 
omnipresent in contemporary experimental science that is fundamentally statistical. 
Th ose levels and estimates are not merely subjective or personal, however. Th e 1884 
Jastrow–Peirce experiments already supplanted intuitions by estimates of degrees of 
confi dence in tactile sensational feelings for groups of subjects. Th eir early research 
exposed how unconscious thought aff ects our judgments and decisions. Th e emotional 
interpretants may even be the only eff ects of the signs. But it is important to recall 
that this happens in artistic contexts rather than in rational inquiry, reasoning and 
experimentation. In non-artistic contexts emotional eff ects come to be allied with 
other kinds of interpretants. It is certainly true that semiosis can cease at the level of 
fi rstness with the production of emotional interpretants, but in that case the interest 
lies in the question of what it is that makes the semiosis cease. Th ere must be more to 
the emotional interpretants than the mere qualitative aspect of fi rstness.
Th ere obviously are beliefs that feel good. We are full of them. Wishful thinking 
and self-deception are cases in point, and a bias towards optimism is a common 
characteristic of the human mind that enables us to undertake projects and overrun 
budgets that otherwise would have been better controlled. It is doubtful whether there 
are any evolutionary benefi ts to such non-pathological biases or whether they merely 
manifest the sadly incomplete nature of our neurophysiological, social and cultural 
development. But be that as it may, such biases and irrational cognitive issues have 
little to do with real scientifi c attitudes,9 as the formation of scientifi c attitudes takes 
9 Th is is not to deny that scientists would not be liable to confi rmation bias or its subtypes 
such as experimenter’s bias or attentional bias. But unlike other methods of fi xing beliefs, 
the self-correcting method of science helps to mitigate the eff ects of such biases, should the 
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place at the pre-belief stage and has a defi nite logical form. Th at abductive schema 
represents the logical reasoning for discovery and therefore has little or nothing to do 
with the psychology of beliefs. Emotional interpretants, if anything, communicate us 
about our own twisted understanding of what the fake-free and sham-free reasoning 
ought to be about. Beliefs that feel good have something wrong with them. Once we 
become self-aware and recognize this sorry state of aff airs, a doubt is produced and 
those beliefs and the processes that generated them are submitted to further scrutiny 
for correction. Science needs to remain dull and dry. 
Th ere are two aspects of a Peircean theory of emotions that I fi nd particularly 
valuable. First, while Peirce had no time or patience to develop upon his brief remarks 
on emotions and emotional interpretants, he took them to have suffi  cient propositional 
content to be expressed and that content analysed, not in natural language, but 
in the language of graphs. A deeper analysis of what belongs to Peirce’s preferred 
groups of notions concerning fi rstness: tones and qualisigns (qualia), immediate 
consciousness, and logically indecomposable elements of thought reveal a rich 
theoretical structure within which emotional interpretants are embedded. Peirce 
even wanted consciousness to be a subject matter for logic. Objects of consciousness 
such as “the feelings a symphony inspires or that which is in the soul of a furiously 
angry man in [the] presence of his enemy” can, Peirce held, be “perfectly expressed” 
in the various logical graphs he pioneered, especially the tinctured graphs suitable 
for representing a range of non-declarative assertions.10 As emotional interpretants 
serve interpretational purposes, the question of the truth and falsity, rightness and 
wrongness, or being better or worse, are evaluated in the light of what is there in the 
universes of discourse of heraldic tinctures that consist of a variety of non-declarative 
and non-extensional entities, capacities, tendencies and intentions. Among such 
entities Peirce lists subjective possibilities, freedom and ability, and whatever is 
commanded, compelled, interrogated, rationally necessitated, or resolved upon (MS 
292). Namely, the evaluation is determined by what the dynamic objects are in those 
future inquiry reach the level of beliefs in scientifi c propositions beyond the pre-belief stage of 
weaker attitudes of making conjectures. Th e importance of being vary of such biases cannot be 
overemphasized, as there is no better way to screw up an experiment than to expect it to turn 
out in a certain way while designing it.
10 “Th ere are countless Objects of Consciousness that words cannot express; such as the feelings 
a symphony inspires or that which is in the soul of a furiously angry man in [the] presence of 
his enemy. But all these can perfectly be expressed in Graphs. Let us call all that ever could be 
present to the mind in any way or any sense, when taken collectively, the Phaneron. Th en every 
thought is a Constituent of the Phaneron, and much besides that would not ordinarily be called 
a Th ought. And therefore there can be no better instrument for thinking about Constituents of 
the Phaneron – which is itself too evanescent for defi nite comprehension – than to think about 
Existential Graphs” (MS 499(s), “Z”, Monist 1907 Scheme).
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domains, or what there is in the provinces of the areas of tinctures graphs, as Peirce 
explained his late multi-modal theory of existential graphs. Th ese graphs, especially as 
they concern the variety of assertional signs (the ‘phemes’), are the ultimate extension 
of Peirce’s theory of propositions and dicisigns.11 Th ey thus serve to analyse and make 
precise the possible inferential relationship in what is only loosely characterized as 
the component of feelings or judgments in emotional interpretants.
Th e second point concerns an open question that I fi nd of immense theoretical 
importance, and to which Henrik Rydenfelt’s “Emotional interpretants and ethical 
inquiry” tenders a fascinating contribution. Peirce spent the rest of his life trying to 
demonstrate what I call the semeiotic completeness of his architectonic. Semeiotic 
completeness states that everything that is the conclusion in critics is provable in 
speculative grammar. But fi rst, to reach completeness, one needs to fi rst prove the 
soundness. Here Peirce reached this central metalogical result of the relationship 
between the two levels of the logical system, grammar and critics, in his 1903 Lowell 
Lectures.12 What the soundness of reasoning consists of, he manages to show, is an 
establishment of a passage from the clause that an argument is valid if for any object 
that the premises represent, the conclusion represents it as well, to the clause that an 
argument is valid if for any object that the signs represent, the interpretant represents 
it as well. We get the latter clause from the facts that the premises are a sign of the 
conclusion and that the conclusion is the (immediate) interpretant of the sign. In sound 
reasoning, one is always entitled to move from the former to the latter. Now conclusions 
are interpretants. But how about the other direction? Here some complexities present 
themselves. Are, for example, emotional interpretants conclusions? It is not obvious 
that they are. Rydenfelt’s paper provides some reason to think they are. Namely, 
the suggestion is that there are fi nal emotional interpretants that serve important 
cognitive and interpretational purposes in inquiry. (Rydenfelt focuses on ethical 
inquiry, but reasoning and logic belong to normative sciences and repose on ethics.) 
If those purposes are well defi ned, also the associated cognitive and interpretational 
processes are stable and the emotional interpretants could thus well be conceived as 
conclusions of rational arguments concerning normative questions. Rydenfelt argues 
11 “[T]he ‘Pheme’, embraces all Propositions; but not only Propositions, but also all Inter-
rogations and Commands, whether they be uttered in words or signalled by fl ags, or 
trumpetted, or whether they be facts of nature like an earthquake (saying “Get out of here!”) 
or the black vomit in yellow fewer (with other symptoms of disease, which virtually declare, 
or are supposed to declare, some state of health to exist). Such a sign intends or has the air of 
intending to force some idea (in an interrogation), or some action (in a command), or some 
belief (in an assertion), upon the interpreter of it, just as if it were the direct and unmodifi ed 
eff ect of that which it represents” (MS 292, Draft  of Prolegomena).
12 Th e proof is found in the fi rst, unpublished and undelivered lecture, MS 454, not in “What 
Makes a Reasoning Sound?” published in the EP 2.
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that the purposes of feelings are three-fold: they can be the kalos-like ideals sought for 
their own sake (which may require us to take a brief excursion to Peirce’s esthetics), 
or practical, or cognitive. Th is nice new trichotomy somewhat furthers Peirce’s own 
account. It is the thirdness of this classifi cation, the cognitive or the intellectual, of the 
purposes of feelings that transpire in fi nal emotional interpretants. Th ese interpretants 
are real just as the habits are, and make sense of what the true and false (or better and 
worse) emotions are according to the creative intentions of the signs’ producers.13 What 
is meant by false emotions it is meant not that the experience of happiness or horror 
would not be there, but that such experiences would not overlap with the intended 
interpretant of the sign of those feelings. Lacking veracity, some people simply would 
not experience the same fabricated emotions. Transcranial magnetic stimulation either 
fails to produce hallucinations or experiences comparable to religious beliefs, or else 
those experiences would be distinguished as diff erent from others that are grounded 
in reality with ease. Dawkins never experienced the God delusion no matter how 
hard he tried. 
But how does such a reasoning work? All rational arguments, even in ethical inquiry, 
must proceed according to some reason; that is, there is some leading principle according 
to which we must reason. Now habits are such leading principles (Bellucci, Pietarinen 
in press a). If ethics, as Rydenfelt’s paper suggests, and as Gustafsson and Pietarinen (in 
press) also conclude, is amenable to investigation according to the scientifi c method, 
those leading principles in normative arguments are habits of feeling. 
And if no further missing varieties stand up in Peirce’s classifi cation of interpretants 
that cannot be conceived as conclusions of an argument then we would be ready to 
conclude semeiotic completeness: speculative grammar and critics are the two theories, 
levels or perspectives to talk about one and the same thing. 
We should not rush to the conclusion that speculative rhetoric fi ts this completeness 
picture, not quite as yet, that is: by its very nature it is much more loosely characterized 
as a fi eld of study than the grammar and critics. But this is precisely as it ought to be, 
given that any investigation begins with vague meanings that come to be clarifi ed 
in the process through conceptual growth. Yet Peirce presumed all three to form a 
unity, and so the demonstration of completeness is not complete before speculative 
rhetoric is brought in. My example above concerning the element that Peirce thought 
to be a rhetorical one in his theory of graphs, and which future research showed to 
be an important element of the logic proper, serves as a confi dence builder towards 
the unity of the trivium. Another is that many aspects of rhetoric are readily there in 
the area of speculative grammar: one fi nds for instance a rich classifi cation of speech 
13 Furthermore, cognitive signs also presuppose real objects: “Th e signs it represents are signs 
presented as cognitive, that is as conformed to a real object”. By real, Peirce means “that which 
is such as it is whatever you or I or any generation of men may opine or otherwise think that it 
is” (MS 498, see Pietarinen 2015b).
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and hear acts in speculative grammar, while their nature is investigated in speculative 
rhetoric (see Peirce’s paper in this issue).
In this light it is rather surprising that neither Rydenfelt nor Chevalier take the 
reality of habits of feelings to play any part in their respective arguments. Yet habits 
of feeling are all-important in Peirce’s normative theories: Peirce actually defi ned 
esthetics as “the theory of the deliberate formation of such habits of feeling” (CP 
1.574). Th at there are habits of feeling is central to the understanding of what Peirce 
intended to accomplish with his pragmatistic approach to normative sciences. I have 
argued (Pietarinen 2009) that the fi nal (or ultimate, eventual or representative) esthetic 
interpretants are such generalized tendencies or habits of feelings. If that argument 
holds, it is patent that fi nal emotional interpretants are habits of feelings, too, albeit 
not of course the same sorts of habits.14 Aft er all, ethics reposes on esthetics in Peirce’s 
classifi cation of sciences. 
In an important unpublished manuscript entitled “Th e basis of pragmatism” (to 
appear in Logic of the Future), Peirce tells us that “habits, so to call them, must be 
capable of being modifi ed according to some ideal in the mind of the controlling 
agent” (MS 280, 1905). Now such habits are rules for thinking about, and thus rules for 
proper conduct concerning, the meaning of signs. Habits are modifi ed with reference 
to the purpose or ideal that agents have in their minds, but such an ideal is at the same 
time part or feature of controlled habits, habits that have to do with feeling and not 
solely with thinking or action. Th erefore, the habits of feeling that these fi nal esthetic 
interpretants give rise to are controlled and criticized as well as self-controlled and, 
in Peirce’s odd terms, “hetero-criticized” (CP 1.574). Th ese considerations, mutatis 
mutandis, pertain to fi nal (or logical, ultimate, eventual, representative) emotional 
interpretants. And over and above deliberate control habits of feeling need control 
with respect to themselves, as well as control with respect to those habits that criticize 
the forms of self-control. “When one reasons, it is that critical self that one is trying to 
persuade”, Peirce comments in CP 5.421. Th is move makes normative interpretations 
14 In a nutshell, the argument is this. (1) Signs are vehicles of communication. (2) Art is a 
form of communication. (3) Art has meaning and purpose because, among other systems of 
signs, art functions as a system of signs. It functions as a system of signs because it interprets 
information that we acquire in experience. (4) Artwork can have objects through interpretants. 
(5) Such ‘esthetic’ interpretants by which art can have objects aim at answering how-questions 
rather than wh-questions. (6) Lastly, ‘Final esthetic interpretants’ are habits of feeling and 
thus general; they are species of habits of action associated with the creation of artwork. Th e 
conclusion that we arrive at is a paraphrase of Peirce’s famous assertion that esthetics is a 
normative study of “ideals qua ideals”. In other words, esthetics is scientifi c inquiry on the 
subject matter of what is “most admirable in itself regardless of any ulterior reason” (CP 1.611). 
Th e proper pursuit of such inquiry needs, as argued in Pietarinen 2009, the introduction of 
the concept of a fi nal esthetic interpretant. Th is is in line with the emergence of ‘fi nal logical 
interpretants’ in Peirce’s pragmatistic theory of signs.
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a rational activity free from singular accidents of particular minds or human minds 
that perform evaluations in actual interpretive situations. Such interpretations involve 
reasoning, but that reasoning is not only a conscious, self-controlled action directed 
towards ideals but of the nature of “taking a habit” (CP 5.440). Taking a habit is a 
rule-governed feeling of a certain kind. Ideals, on the other hand, are “must be” (CP 
1.574) generals, habits of feeling in certain ways in certain kinds of situations. And 
from Peirce’s standpoint, it is then the theory of such formation, acquisition and 
modifi cation of habits of feeling that characterises scientifi c and pragmatistic study 
of normative ethical inquiry.
Habits of feelings are thus indispensable in an adequate theory of pragmatistic 
normativity. Th ey also answer some common worries that follow from taking 
assignment of values to normative statements dependent on emotions and gut 
reactions. Perceiving a young muslim girl screaming while her genitals are mutilated 
with a sharp knife has factual content that leads, through abstraction and thus 
involving reasoning, to a conclusion that cutting sensitive parts of your body with a 
sharp tool has a general tendency to cause pain. Our experience tells, further, that it 
is overwhelmingly better not to feel continuous and possibly life-long physical and 
emotional pain, suff ering and distress. You can further demonstrate the immediate 
reactions by performing an fMRI scan of the victim’s brain states – or maybe also 
your own – but that is only a condiment to the judgment that has already been formed. 
Make no Hume here: no one is claiming to deduce or demonstrate the ‘ought’ from 
the ‘is’ – the leading principles of these abstractions are the habits of feeling that 
have generality and thus govern the reasoning, but they are not themselves elements 
(premisses) of that reasoning. In semeiotic terms, in normative reasoning no fi nal 
ethical interpretant can be considered as a sign without employing in this reasoning 
that very same ethical interpretant. A fi nal ethical interpretant is thus un-eliminable 
just as fi nal logical interpretants are: no matter how many times you transform it into 
a sign it continues to act as a habit of feeling.
An important principle behind the previous argument is exposed in Frederik 
Stjernfelt’s brief and eminently useful “Blocking evil infi nities: A note on a note 
on a Peircean strategy”, which every semiotician, past, present and future, ought to 
read. Th ere is only a brief comment that I need to add to it. One might wonder that 
hypostatical abstraction, which adds an arity to the abstracted predicate by quantifying 
over the basic relation is itself subject to the ill-named ‘infi nite semiosis’. Stjernfelt 
rightly explains that here the nota notae kicks in, as “standing in a relation to” and 
“standing in a relation of standing in the relation to” do not diff er in meaning. My 
remark is that it is one of the masterful fi ndings of category theory that the relations of 
morphisms (functors over objects and morphism to relate categories) and relations over 
functors (natural transformations to relate functors) are both needed for a complete 
theory, and it is the latter that has an irreducible status. Th e generation of relations 
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of relations halts at natural transformations, which are the thirdness of relations 
(take categories with objects and morphisms as fi rstness and the functor category 
as secondness. A curiosity: a functor from an index category to a category is known 
as a diagram). Th e reason is that for ordinary categories, a composition of natural 
transformations is itself a natural transformation! It is nota notae all over again, now 
on what Peirce would have taken to depict relational generality, a teridentity as it 
occurs in category theory. 
Such categories and mappings between them have their focus of interest in 
the commutativity and associativity properties. Transitivity comes into play with 
teridentities, with natural transformations as generalized isomorphisms. Category-
theoretic diagrams are icons that add new structural features to them as soon as the 
diagram of the category commutes. Th us category theory is a modern Peircean way of 
promoting relations and mappings as the fi rst-class citizens.15 A related point is that 
the arity of “standing in a relation of Z to Y” involves a lower-order relation Z that has 
its own arity. In Peirce’s logic of potentials, which is his most serious attempt at the 
logic of abstraction (there were other attempts throughout), the “standing in a three-
place relation” (“Y stands in the triadic relation X to Z for W”, MS 478) is the ultimate 
hypostatically abstracted relation that is ever needed: provided that the irreducibility 
thesis generalizes to potentials then all other abstractions can be generated based on 
“standing in a three-place relation”. As far as I know no one has attempted or even 
proposed the question of proving the generalized irreducibility thesis with respect to 
the higher-order logic of potentials, however.
Stjernfelt concludes that the primitive or irreducible ontology – the “rock bottom”, 
though not the “foundations” in any old-fashioned sense as pragmaticism is anti-
foundationalism – consists of relations (though presumably only those conforming 
to nota notae), continuous predicates, leading principles and habits. Th is suggests 
a healthy incentive to metaphysical investigations. What else is there? I would add 
that elements of logic needed to analyse that furniture are there: phanerons, the 
phemic sheets, quasi-minds, universes of discourse, teridentities, rhemas of second 
intention, abstractions and potentials (second-order entities), as well as the tig-signs 
(Pietarinen, Snellman 2006), namely thoughts, intellectual concepts and generalities 
(at least insofar as those also conform to the nota notae), as it is on the basis of such 
tig-signs that Peirce set out to prove his pragmaticism. But that is where our rudimental 
furnishing of the world soon has to come to an end. Th e rules of inference, and the 
basic laws of logic, in contrast, are man-made, which of course does not imply that 
their validity or justifi cation would depend on the vagaries of a single mind or on a 
psychology of a reasoner. “Our Reason is akin to the Reason that governs the Universe” 
15 Calling it a structuralist theory would not be terribly misleading if not confused with 
semiological structuralism based on altogether diff erent ideas quite diametrically opposed to 
Peirce’s.
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(Charles Peirce to William James, December 25, 1909): two interdependent reasons 
to justify the rules and laws of logic without circularity or logocentric predicaments.
It may not be so easy to resist the temptation and switch to some all-encompassing 
principle that sorts everything into tidy compartments. Chevalier cautions against 
such approach in his comment on Marc Champagne’s “A less simplistic metaphysics: 
Peirce’s layered theory of meaning as a layered theory of being”. Champagne uses a 
modal principle – as such one quarter of Kant’s pure concepts of understanding – to 
partition ontology tout court into possibilities, actualities and regularities. Th is is a 
descriptive approach to the method of metaphysics, which contrasts the revisionary one 
that aims at dispensing with any categories, postulating instead some direct access to 
the constituents of the world. Methodologically, the descriptive one is closer to Peirce’s 
intentions and to his scientifi c and critical metaphysics, and thus has something to 
recommend itself. Th e question is whether the modal principle is the proper schema to 
be applied.16 Merely combinatorially it is unlikely to succeed: Peirce’s division of sign 
classes is of ever increasing complexity, where modalities turn up selectively and only 
in some well-justifi ed nooks and corners of the overall theory. It is hard to conclude, 
for example, from the presumption that qualisigns are logical possibilities, sinsigns 
actualities and legisigns logical necessities, together with the modal subsumption 
between them, that all trichotomies, even those that the future will bring, were to be 
so partitioned. Peirce’s late classifi cations are not neat: they produce a soup of wicked 
characteristics and complex dependencies between numerous regenerative classes. 
When Peirce mentions the famous “mixed signs”, and even when they merely are 
cooked from simpleton icons, indices and symbols, they are just that: concentrations 
of mixed solutions and decompositions with surprising and unexpected results. Th e 
glue of nested modals does not stick well between meanings and beings. General, 
singular and indefi nite are all relations of signs to their immediate objects, that is, 
they are types of propositions, and of them only. Generality and necessity do not 
blend here, either; nor do they in the aforementioned trichotomy of signs classifi ed 
“in themselves”, namely the tones/qualisigns, tokens/sinsigns and types/legisigns. 
Likewise, an indefi nite sign (a “vagosign” in 1905) and possibility fi nd no easy match. 
And in principle one needs only one counter-example against the subsumption schema. 
In Peirce’s theory, the sign classes are derived from complex relationships and 
interactions between divisions of signs that are made according to those relationships 
that signs bear to themselves, to their immediate and dynamic objects, to the nature of 
those objects, to the modes of representing them, plus similar complex relationships 
regarding their immediate, dynamic and fi nal/ultimate/eventual/representative 
interpretants, as well as their nature, cause, connection, and form, and modes of 
16 Champagne and Chevalier talk about three modalities, but actuality is not a modality, and 
contingency is defi nable as a possibility that is not necessary. In view of this, actualities do not 
match contingencies. 
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representing those interpretants. Charles Peirce’s “Division of signs” provides a snippet 
of these murky divisions. Th ey generate a really complicated network of relationships 
from which a huge panorama of sign classes is open to view. A universe that would 
generate all that from the basic modal schema would be one miraculously ‘fi ne-tuned’ 
to such signs.
From Peirce’s refusal to talk metaphysics or epistemology when it comes to the 
investigation of notions of being one can make a safe traversal to an exposition of 
mental structures that could match propositional and logical content. Despite having 
been presented two decades ago, Nathan Houser’s paper “Being in the world” has not 
lost its edge on what the best way to understand the structure of cognition and its 
workings is: namely the “moving pictures of thought”, that is, the logical method of 
existential graphs (Pietarinen 2006a; Stjernfelt 2007). His exposition of that method, 
just as Roberts’s (1973), is accurate and faithful to Peirce’s own concepts, resisting 
fi tting the method either to the Procrustean bed of formal theories of logic that 
spawned from the Frege–Russell tradition, or the “visual turn” that the advocates 
of diagrammatic logics have uncritically sported (Bellucci, Pietarinen in press b). 
Th e value of Houser’s paper also draws from the fact that its thesis sustains logical 
notations’ autonomous roles diff erent from the one they were thought to have in 
connection to what in cognitive sciences has become an industry of mental, conceptual 
and cognitive models and spaces, the extended-minds, and so forth. 
When Heidegger wrote in his youthful work quoted by Houser that “being lies 
in the fact that something is, and in its Being as it is; in Reality; in presence-at-hand; 
in subsistence; in validity; in Dasein; in the ‘there is’”, such sentiments only serve to 
testify to those hideous battles he had to weigh in striving to conquest the meaning 
of being – which in the end he of course neither did nor could do, only to be sucked 
ever deeper into the dark waters of fascist poetry. Now the true poetry is found in 
existential graphs. All these meanings of being are captured by the line of identity: 
the continuous line represents the existence of a fact (= the line, as a graph-replica, 
scribed on the sheet of assertion); being as it is (= being qua being: a self-returning 
line expressing being identical to itself, that is, well-defi nedness); reality (= how the 
line is “connected with nature”, that is, its interpretation in the universe of discourse); 
presence-at-hand (= observation of the line scribed on the sheet by the Graphist and 
Grapheus in their fi eld of common experience); subsistence (= class-inclusion); validity 
(= the line scribed on the sheet of assertion as true in all interpretations); the ‘there 
is’ (= existential quantifi cation); and Dasein (= no comment here...). Now what can 
be more beautiful than the poetry of graphs?
We do not speak the language of Graphish but does it matter? Th e elusive nature 
of skeleton-sets that Benoit Gaultier examines in “Some perplexities about Peirce’s 
‘skeleton ideas’” also concern the question of the basic forms or constituents of our 
cognition. For Peirce, these skeletons were at one time the bare building blocks or 
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simple representations of what is essential to relations, and by which important 
other feats of signifi cation such as association or composition of concepts could be 
accomplished. One’s attention in unravelling Peirce’s puzzling proposal is drawn to 
the fact that his remarks on skeleton-sets cover a brief and fairly intermittent episode 
in his work-life: a period in 1893 when he was struggling to free himself from the 
demons of the past and moving on to a fresh start in logical investigations following 
the awkward cosmogonical excursus. Th e fresh start meant the production of the 
Grand Logic. Th e house-on-fi re example from the Short Logic also comes from the 
same period. I believe his 1893 remarks on the skeleton ideas have to be interpreted 
against the related developments and the experiments he conducted on various logical 
notations given his newfangled logical work, and thus cannot be fully understood 
apart from what those developments were soon to achieve. 
Th e explanation I would off er is that by the time Peirce made his remarks on 
skeleton-sets his concept of rhemas, as indeed the trichotomy of rhemas-propositions-
arguments, was not yet quite clear from mist. As soon as they were, and certainly by 
1903, skeleton-set ideas were perfectly captured by the rhemata. Th ere is a gradual 
discovery of the logical form of the rhemata as consisting of valencies, hooks on their 
peripheries, and the lines connecting to the hooks, since about 1894 (MS 533; Bellucci, 
Pietarinen in press c). It is therefore understandable that the skeleton-sets alone do not 
explain, as Gaultier rightly remarks, why some particular ideas come to be associated 
in the mind with some other particular ideas, and why they explain only the possibility 
of coming to be so associated. Rhemata are incomplete signs that represent immediate 
objects as possible, but they do not represent them as existent or as law-like objects. 
Th ey nevertheless carry out this representational task as they do have a form, which 
is a blank form of propositions. Rhemata do not exist unless the blanks are fi lled with 
names of defi nitely recognized individuals. As representations of possibilities, these 
unsaturated and skeletonized relational terms call up positive and distinct images in 
the mind, which explains much of the required associative character they have when 
those images are contemplated in the imagination. Peirce later explains the connection 
between rhemata and minds by remarking that “the rhemata call up images, which 
in the proposition are represented to be applicable to the objects of the names” (MS 
516, 1902). Gaultier observes that the skeleton-sets indicate “both the structure of our 
thoughts and their content”. Th e later development of rhemas makes this confounded 
statement that Peirce seems to have been guilty of more precise: rhemata indicate how 
the content is structured, which in turn is expressed in their valencies. As spots, that 
is, as what the indecomposable elements of thought become in the logic of graphs, 
they logically analyse that structure.
In his later works Peirce focuses on the compositional issues concerning the basic 
elements of logical graphs, and there the correlated mental task becomes the issue 
concerning the composition of concepts rather than the associativity of ideas. Th e 
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question is made more precise as soon as he has the necessary logical tools at hand to 
discourse upon the problems of composition of concepts and the indecomposability of 
those basic elements of thought.17 Th e indecomposable elements of thought are what in 
the spots in the graphs correspond to in connection to cognition; they are, like rhemas, 
indefi nite elements of the propositional meaning category and thus without defi nite 
boundaries. Graphically this means that that the hooks on their peripheries are not 
connected with dots or lines of identities. Th is also explains why skeletons, just as rhemas 
and spots, can be made of dots and lines that denote the hooks and valencies, although 
they are not made of dots as lines of identities in the sense of dots and lines making 
predications by fi lling in those blanks by names. Being indefi nite in meaning, rhemata 
and spots have no defi nite boundaries as far as their signifi cation is concerned. Existential 
graphs thus work out a solution to what in his confusing transitory period was perceived 
as the problem of the associativity of vague ideas and confusingly explained in terms of 
skeleton-sets.18 Likewise, the argument for the indecomposable elements of the phaneron 
adds more grist to his mill in support of the negative part of the irreducibility of triads. 
Above all, his earlier ideas about skeleton sets became more defi nite and meaningful as 
soon as he managed to devise such a system of expression that he thought “to express 
any proposition whatever without being embarrassed by its complexity, which shall be 
absolutely free from ambiguity, perfectly regular in its syntax, free from all disturbing 
suggestions, and come as near to a clear skeleton diagram of that element of the fact 
which is pertinent to the reasoning as possible” (MS S 27, 1903, Draft  of the 2nd Lowell 
Lecture) – namely the theory of existential graphs.19
17 “[T]he ways in which Terms and Arguments can be compounded cannot diff er greatly 
from the ways in which Propositions can be compounded. A mystery, or paradox, has always 
overhung the question of the Composition of Concepts. Namely, if two concepts, A and B, are to 
be compounded, their composition would seem to be necessarily a third ingredient, Concept C, 
and the same diffi  culty will arise as to the Composition of A and C. But the Method of Existential 
Graphs solves this riddle instantly by showing that as far as propositions go, and it must evidently 
be the same with Terms and Arguments, there is but one general way in which their Composition 
can possibly take place; namely each component must be indeterminate in some respect or 
another; and in their composition each determines the other. On the recto this is obvious: ‘Some 
man is rich’ is composed of ‘Something is a man’ and ‘something is rich’, and the two somethings 
merely explain each other’s vagueness in a measure” (MS 292; cf. Pietarinen 2005b on how to 
resolve the problem of composition of concepts in existential graphs).
18 “[T]he Diagrammatization of Existential Graphs shows beyond all doubt to the discerning 
mind that the Composition of Concepts can only take place by the reciprocal precisions of 
indefi nitenesses” (MS 499(s), “Z” Monist Scheme).
19 To bridge my point concerning skeleton-sets as rhemas to the previous two papers on 
emotional interpretants and to ethical and normative inquiry, one could recall that Peirce’s 
theory of meaning categories takes “esthetic goodness” to be possesed by any kind of 
representamen, be it a rhema, a proposition or an argument, while “moral goodness [...] may 
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Peirce thus took it that indefi nite propositions, such as rhemata, spots and 
skeletonized diagrams, call up some vague images in the mind. Are mental images 
then best understood and analysed as a sign-theoretic phenomenon? Th is intriguing 
hypothesis is one of those fruits Peirce’s theory of signs bears that still awaits to 
be cashed in. Jelena Issajeva’s sign-theoretic approach to mental imagery in “Sign 
theory at work: Th e mental-imagery debate revisited” is a contribution to that debate, 
arguing that the properties and relations in the images make them amenable to a 
sign-theoretic analysis and even to the methods of experimental semiotics. Issajeva 
wishes to replace the traditional representational accounts that take imagery as a 
specifi c internal representation, either quasi-pictorial or propositional/verbal, with 
the functional and systemic approach inspired by Peirce’s theory. Overcoming the 
oversimplifying pictorial/linguistic, symbolic/connectionist, or symbolic/iconic 
barriers is to be saluted. But are Peirce’s signs systems? Are they functional? Are they 
non-representational? Some papers earlier in the issue, especially those by Pape and 
Gustafsson, argue for semiosis as primarily a processual phenomenon. Pape further 
argues that objects are constructed out of the functional roles in systems of signs. 
Maybe the open-systems methodology and the dynamic character of such systems can 
do the trick of conceiving of signs as systems (Pietarinen 2004b), as it would be quite 
non-Peircean to think of signs in any structuralist sense as forming closed systems 
with a network of inexhaustibly interconnected signifi ers. Cognitive architectures 
are typically structural and functional models of intelligent processes of mental 
imagination, and a Peircean one is distinguished from those in capturing the open, 
continuous, adaptive and de-centralized phenomena that natural and evolutionary 
theories predict it to have.
Second, problems arise when taking mental properties to concern the essential 
characters of mental imagery as functional properties defi ned by their causal role 
or power in the system. Does functionalism capture the mentality in the sense of 
sensory qualities and qualia, such as sensations, feelings and appearances? Here 
Peirce’s qualisigns are helpful in clarifying these issues. Still, an important question 
remains: what is a functional property, and where is it realized? Does a pan-semiotic 
predicament inevitably follow from functionalism, and would such a dire consequence 
defeat the proposal analogously to what happened to computationalism?
Th ird, I do not think enriching the imagery debate with a semiotic methodology is 
to give up the representational “paradigm”. Even the “fi rst fi rstnesses”, namely images, 
do represent, as they are rhemata or spots in Peirce’s theory of signs and logic. Th e 
motivation of why to give it up is not obvious. Signs are representations. As signs are 
be possessed by a proposition or by an argument, but cannot be possessed by a rhema” (CP 
5.141). Th e imagery that the latter calls up would be too weak and unclear to be of lasting 
value for ethical considerations and dilemmas. Whether this proves that some remote thought-
experiments (the Trolley problem, Swampman, a Brain-in-a-Vat) are of little or no interest is 
to be investigated elsewhere.
 Recent studies on signs: Commentary and perspectives  641
contextual and give rise to their interpretations in connection to interpreting minds, 
there is no homunculus-induced regression to be feared of. Th e usual suspects in the 
anti-representational camp simple-mindedly take representations somehow to mirror 
the reality, just to attack the straw man. In doing so they fail to appreciate the richness 
that sign-theoretic representations have in their possession. Maybe the dynamical, 
coupled-system and EEEE-related20 mental states, subject to co-evolutionary forces 
and laws of natural selection, are incorrectly tagged as anti-representational in the 
literature. However, it may be helpful to take representational states in the wider sense 
of the triadic structure of signs. In this and also some other senses that we have no 
space to discuss here, Houser’s argument that favours existential graphs as the model 
of cognition as well as Issajeva’s paper both propose some novel and under-explored 
directions to the fi elds of cognitive sciences and cognitive semiotics. I have proposed 
(see Pietarinen 2011b) that spots or rhemata in existential graphs are images, or the 
“fi rst fi rstnesses” of hypoicons, alongside with diagrams and metaphors. Houser 
proposes that spots correspond to percepts, thus linking perception, thought and 
propositional content by the manner spots operate in the theory of existential graphs.21 
Issajeva takes images to be rhemata. My goal was to argue that non-logical alphabet in 
the logic of graphs has a natural interpretation that assigns logical status to images. Th e 
three are not that diff erent. Maybe we can agree with Peirce that “the rhemata simply 
call up images” (MS 516). At any event, if mental imagery has that nature of signs (and 
we would do well not to confuse images or imagery with visual images or pictures), 
there is a logical theory readily at hand for analysing mental imagery, yet antedating 
the recent labours by nearly a century. Indices link graph-instances with nature or 
with the universe of discourse and thus with the bodies, their surroundings and the 
world. Th e graphs model embodiment of cognition with the aid of indices. Since they 
are models, we can study and experiment with them, and observe what invariants there 
may be when the components of graphs come to have various interpretations under 
various circumstances. Existential graphs confront the reality head-on, or should I 
say the loose ends of the lines on: once you scribe a dot, you have begun modelling 
not only what exists that is well-defi ned (in the sense of being identical to itself) but 
also your intellectual thought processes.
As a point of comparison, Euler diagrams, which are the topic of Amirouche 
Moktefi ’s “Is Euler’s circle a symbol or an icon?”, have no ‘being in the world’ since they 
lack such lines and therefore do not express propositions or existence of individuals. 
20 Embodied, embedded, enacted, extended.
21 What is worth noting is that percepts have their immediate objects which according to 
Peirce are “excessively vague” (MS 292). Th ey are felt, but not thought of. Percepts, unlike 
perceptual judgments, are not propositions, but whether this serves as a counterexample to 
Bellucci’s thesis that only propositions have immediate objects depends on how we view the 
encoding of graphs to cognitions, or the status of graphical assertions as models of cognition, 
and how that encoding preserves the propositional structure or content.
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Th e being in the world is excommunicated by dispensing with the idea of the logical 
form altogether. Euler’s circles famously lack expressivity, but what about their iconicity? 
Peirce’s answer to the title question is that “circles by which Euler represents relations 
of terms [...] well fulfi ll the function of icons” (CP 3.363, 1885). Th is does not mean 
that they are not symbols. Some other features, such as the shading that Venn and 
Peirce came to propose (possibly independently of each other or else Peirce was suff ering 
from cryptomnesia) is a conventional sign, that is, a symbol (Moktefi , Pietarinen 2015). 
What Euler diagrams lack is the ability to refer to the subjects of discourse. But how 
to understand iconicity in Euler diagrams? Moktefi ’s interest is in seeking support to 
the hypothesis that Euler’s circles have a higher degree of iconicity than what Peirce 
came to attribute to them, or what usually is thought of them, even higher than what is 
attributed to other kinds of diagrams and notations. It is this highest kind of iconicity 
that explains, according to Moktefi , why Euler diagrams “work so well”. 
Working well depends on one’s purposes: for Peirce they of course ultimately fail 
to serve the purposes of logic, analysis and representation, for a number of reasons.22 
But let us ignore such criticism for now and investigate what a higher iconicity could 
mean. Moktefi  suggests that the interest lies not in arguing for a higher degree in 
representing properties of relations but in that those signs of Euler diagrams, namely 
the simple closed circles representing classes, are the properties of relations.
Th ere are countless properties of relations that circles and their geometrical 
arrangements do not capture, neither as representations nor as being those very 
relations, although the latter is surely a much more stringent constraint: non-primitive 
recursion, for example, is not geometrically or “physically” representable in any natural 
or informative way with such circles, and certain confi gurations derived from fi ve arcs 
or using fi ft een regions are impossible to represent on an Euclidean plane altogether 
(Sinden 1966). So there are fundamental limitations to what kinds of relations can 
be expressed using the geometric mechanism of Euler’s circles. Similar limitations 
haunt many other kinds of logical diagrams. So it must be that any claim for a higher 
degree of iconicity is with respect to some limited set of relations and their properties. 
In the case of circles the transitivity of containment may present itself as a natural 
candidate, but that example does not generalize. How then to support the claim that 
Euler’s circles work so well?
Ignoring the fact that the iconicity of containment does not generalize and that 
there are many relations and properties that are left  unexpressed, what is the validity 
of the claim that nested circles are the transitivity property of the containment 
relation and not the representation of that property of the relation? If that containment 
relation is the fact of the world, and that fact has certain logic, there are no further 
22 Among them are that the system “cannot affi  rm the existence of any description of an 
object”; their inadequacy of dealing with disjunctions in a general case; and, fatally, that the 
system “has no vital power of growth beyond the point to which it has been carried” (MS 491). 
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representatives for that fact, no logical constant or logical form to represent the fact. 
Th e forms for such logic are not self-sustaining; they are the forms of their objects, 
namely do not exist independently of those objects whose forms they are. Th us such 
forms do not admit of alternative interpretations. Th eir form is what the form of the 
class is. Th is seems unnecessarily restrictive. For example, imagine that the circles 
would need to be interpreted diff erently from the way they are interpreted when 
being the facts of classes standing in a containment relation to each another. Two 
non-overlapping circles would apparently have nothing to show about the physical or 
geometrical fact of containment. Yet they would carry the form of the facts from which 
they are indistinguishable to the situations in which they are non-overlapping. How 
could I then understand the diff erence in the relationship between non-overlapping 
circles and nested circles? Does an undiscovered tribe in Sumatra naturally think 
that the circle with a smaller radius is necessarily contained in another with a longer 
radius, no matter circles being nested or not? Th e upshot is that such re-interpretations 
would be impossible to achieve, since the circles, lacking the status of self-sustaining 
logical forms, would simply not be re-interpretable in the required manner, since 
the nesting is defi ned by necessity to be the containment relation between classes. In 
other words, Moktefi ’s idea that the circles do not represent, but are, the relation leads 
to universalism concerning the meaning of logical constants: their meaning is given 
by the very physical form, once and for all, and not by our interpretations of those 
forms. However, is this not then what iconicity in Peirce’s sense is supposed to be all 
about? Not quite, since such universalism leads to semantic ineff ability concerning 
the relations between logic and what it speaks or shows to be the case about. Semantic 
ineff ability is the tenet that we cannot vary the meaning relations by applying logical 
constants or pieces of notation and signs in their contexts. Ineff ability contradicts 
iconicity, as in existential graphs for example the signifi cation of the line of identity 
depends on which context it is embedded in, that is, it depends on the nested system 
of cuts. Cuts, in turn, depend on the relation of illation. Th e relation of illation, in 
turn, is represented by two nested thin ovals (or “the scroll”), but its signifi cation is 
not a containment between classes. If so, circles cannot be truly iconic, because being 
an icon presupposes the possibility of structure-preserving mappings from icons to 
their objects, and those mappings may have to vary from case to case (properties of 
mappings are defi ned by the specifi c cases of comparison). Th ere are further properties 
to icons not shared by Moktefi ’s account of Euler’s circles which we need not delve into 
here, but they share the idea that there is liberty in interpretational considerations for 
what the logical forms are and how they are connected to their models. 
In other words, if the circle, as a class, carries its own logical form, how am I 
supposed to be able to understand what a complex system of such circles means if I 
only know what the classes are? I know nothing about how those circles are related 
to one another, since the circles are presumed to be their own logical forms. Th e only 
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determining factor one can resort to is the presence of a simple Euclidean geometry, 
but that is very limited expressively, prohibits real iconicity and is thus ultimately a 
deceptive asset. In other words, the totality of possible relations and properties of 
relations that one wants to capture matches the totality of the logical forms given 
by circles and their combinations. If all you have are Euler’s circles, then everything 
in the world would start to look like circles. But why assume that it is the objects or 
classes as those objects that give or determine their logical form? If only facts and not 
complex logical forms can express or show the facts concerning the confi guration of 
objects, then not only Euler’s circles but all logical notations, in particular those that 
force some geometrical relationships between names or classes, also are such facts 
(and not independent logical forms) that express or show those object confi gurations.
Simple planar geometry does not imply higher iconicity, as the constraints are so 
severe. Nor is iconicity a free pass to greater expressivity, quite the contrary: taken 
in a concrete, physical sense it would rigidify the notation and limit the system’s 
expressive power. Taken in Peirce’s sense, it needs to be investigated, case by case, 
whether a proposed iconic representation implies something good as to the analyticity 
or expressivity or some other virtues of one’s logical language. 
Moktefi  writes that linear diagrams “proceed exactly as Euler’s do”. Th is should not 
be read so that the two are equivalent in their expressive power: linear diagrams fail to 
capture every syllogism. Same level or degree of iconicity (and these qualifi cations seem 
to me to be moot and currently ill-defi ned) does not imply that the same meanings or 
inferences get to be expressed. Th at the dotted lines (which need further assume to be 
orthogonal to the line segments, and the plane be Euclidean with the fi ft h postulate) 
“act exactly as Peirce’s lines of identity” cannot be right, since linear diagrams have 
nothing to do with quantifi cation. Estonia is a proper physical part of the map of 
Europe with has continuous borders, but what about Reunion or Sint Eustatius? Is 
yeast part of the bread? Is a sign part of the mind? Is a mind part of the brain? Inclusion 
exclusively defi ned by physical or geometrical constraints quickly leads to troubles 
even in basic mereology. 
Th e containment in mereology is commonly understood as part of the defi nition 
of parthood as a partial ordering: Any part of any part of a thing is itself part of that 
thing, they say. Th is is an interesting application of the nota notae principle. What 
the claimed free ride of the transitivity in nested circles has been in the literature, is 
really an instance of the nota notae. But is transitivity of containment universal even 
in mereology? Is Messi’s left  foot part of the Blaugrana?
Even if we could reply to these charges by changing the defi nition of what the 
basic properties of mereology are to exclude things such as being “distinguished” or 
“functional” parts of the whole, I cannot express in the formal system of Euler graphs the 
basic fact that if A is contained in B, and B is contained in C, then A is contained in C, 
because expressing this fact I would need three variables and three two-place relations, 
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while Euler graphs can express only monadic predicates. We can express transitivity in 
constraint diagrams, but that is already a diff erent ballpark. Would constraint diagrams 
thus be even higher in iconicity than Euler’s diagrams? Or is iconicity simply an illicit 
term to describe what a concrete, physical resemblance between a piece of notation 
(circles) and the classes they are the facts of aims to capture? Moktefi  appeals to a “mental 
process” that Peirce alludes to in forming such relations in imagination, which indeed 
is the gateway to what icons in Peirce’s theory are, but from this he concludes that it 
is the physical resemblance that gives rise to the true iconic form by “imitating” those 
imaginary relations. Furthermore, a dot and a dot that extends to the line or arbitrary 
length and shape are one and the same sign representing the being (in the case of Moktefi ’s 
example, identity). Th ere is no diff erence in iconicity, let alone in the degree of iconicity, 
in representing the beings of individuals and their identities in existential graphs. No 
verbal description distinguishes Figures 7a and 7b (in Moktefi  2015) from each other. To 
claim that Euler diagrams possesses this, or “even higher degree of iconicity”, is to make 
a comparison between apples and oranges: Euler diagrams do not represent individuals, 
or their existence, or identities. Another diff erence that makes the notations in these two 
theories incomparable even in the general case is that existential graphs are not planar, 
although their projections may look like so to the naked eye, since whenever the system 
uses lines of identity (Beta), the third dimension is inevitable to prevent lines crossing 
each other becoming joined. 
Although Euler diagrams are in their expressive power a fragment of existential 
graphs, for those who tend to take understanding Euler diagrams easy and to be based 
on some concrete, visual or physical features it may serve as a useful reminder that 
the general theory of Euler diagrams is as hard as second-order arithmetic (Schaefer, 
Štefankovič 2004). So what are the limits of Euler diagrams, or those of my language? 
Under the Tractarian conception, are they diagrams that only I understand, or the 
only diagrams that I understand?
*  *  *
In closing, it is worth quoting Peirce’s unpublished summary of some of the basic 
notions involved in the previous remarks in length:23
Th ere are three kinds of representamens, or signs: icons, or images; indices; and 
symbols, or general signs. An icon is a sign by virtue of resembling its object, 
which may not even exist; as for example, a statue of a centaur is an image. But 
23 From MS 492, Logical Tracts II, 1903. In these passages Peirce summarizes the key points of 
what he made in the mostly lost parts of the fi rst part of this text, the Logical Tracts I (MS 491).
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strictly speaking, the image is in consciousness. Th e outward statue is an image 
only in the sense that it excites an image in consciousness. An index represents its 
object by virtue of being connected with it in fact, and is necessarily an existing 
thing or fact. A photograph is an index. For, although it calls up an image, yet it 
conveys positive information about its object only because we know that physical 
forces have compelled it to be a faithful likeness. Th is actual fact imparts to the 
photograph a representative effi  ciency, whether the person who looks at it is aware 
of the fact or not. A symbol is a representamen whose representative virtue lies 
in its being interpreted as having such value. Th is, for example, is the character 
of language. Something is whispered in the ear of a king. Th e result may be 
that thousands of men lose their lives, that thousands are born who would not 
otherwise have been born, and that the moral character of a nation is modifi ed. 
Th is is not suffi  ciently accounted for by the fact that the whisper excited an image 
in the mind of the king, or that the acoustic vibrations were physically connected 
with any facts; nor even by any force being put upon the king’s subjects to do as 
they did. Unless you hypnotize a man you can hardly put any force upon him of 
any considerable amount. When we speak of compelling a man to do something, 
what we mean is that we cause considerations in regard to the future to infl uence 
him so as to induce him to act in a given way. Th e representative force of language 
and of every other symbol depends upon the symbol’s being made such as it is 
for the sake of the future. Th is infl uence of the future is what we call reason. It 
is futile to endeavor to show that it can result in any way from any combination 
of imaging (which is only the vestige of the past) and of force (which can only be 
exerted by what is here and now). Th e infl uence of the future must evidently be 
a third element. It cannot actually be in consciousness, although we can have an 
indication of it in consciousness as we can on paper. It is strictly a habit governing 
thought; and as the representative force of the symbol is of this nature, the mode 
of being of the symbol is of the same nature. Th us, the word ‘man’ may occur 
hundreds of times in a book, and of this book there may be myriads of copies. 
Yet every one of these millions of imprints are one and the same word. Th e word 
consists in the habit of thinking about a succession of three characters, m a n, in a 
certain way. It is the same with any symbol. Each mass of ink spread upon paper 
in a shape suffi  ciently like man to be recognized for that, may be called a replica 
of the symbol. All symbols that are created now-a-days, – and I doubt not it was 
so from the very fi rst, – have forms derived more or less according to general 
habits and dispositions of symbolizing. But in case the meaning of a symbol is 
mainly arbitrary the replica in which we fi rst meet with it, which may be called its 
introductory replica for us, will be very indefi nite, as above remarked.
All representamens are either sisigns (semel signa), bisigns, or tersigns, 
according as they are once signs, doubly signs, or triply signs. An icon can only 
be a sisign: a symbol alone can be a tersign. Th e tersign appeals to the reason 
of the interpreter to accept it, and does not concern us here. A photograph is 
an example of a bisign. For on the one hand the manner in which it has been 
produced necessitate its fi delity to nature, while on the other hand, it presents an 
image of that nature. It thus aff ords information; and this is the distinguishing 
characteristic of the typical bisign. But the symbolic bisign is markedly diff erent 
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from the indexical bisign. Th e latter represents the state of things at the moment. 
It is true that the light may be years in coming from the star photographed to 
the photographic plate; nor is the action on the plate instantaneous. But as to the 
former objection, it is the incident rays that constitute the object photographed; 
and as to the latter objection, it misses the point which is that the index represents 
the facts at the very time when the action takes place, which time no doubt is 
always a variable of an integral of action. But a symbolic bisign never primarily 
represents the present time but always future time. It always assumes that the 
truth, the very truth is destined to be discovered. It does not assert this. Far from 
that, its utterer probably believes no such thing. But he goes on that supposition in 
so far as this utterance does; and what he asserts, – subject to that condition, – is 
that something will be discovered. Th e proposition represents a fact, which is, as 
it were, a rag torn out of reality. But the proposition need not be understood as 
asserting that the reality is a patch-work of facts. But in the process of discovery 
knowledge comes in bits, and it is such an item of discovery that the proposition 
represents. Accordingly, the proposition can only express itself by analysis of the 
fact; yet it by no means represents that the fact represented is in itself so analyzed.
Much in the spirit and letter to what we fi nd in the introduction to his 1885 “On 
the algebra of logic: A contribution to the philosophy of notation”, in which the 
triad of icons, indices and tokens (= symbols) is set out to aid the development of a 
perfect (= maximally analytic) system of logical notation springing from algebraic 
considerations, these 1903 sketches of sign trichotomies are promissory notes followed 
by an array of defi nitions that appeal to graphical logical notations. Classifi cations 
of signs may be useful in setting the ground and making the erection of optimal 
theories of reasoning and discovery possible. Peirce thought that any perfect system 
of logic needs to exemplify these basic trichotomies. In more than one senses, then, 
his theory of signs is a prelude to his work on logical notation and to his philosophy of 
pragmaticism rather than a fi nished theoretical product with autonomous interest; an 
overture that feeds some basic assumptions and conceptualizations concerning signs 
to theories of logic and pragmaticism, and thus in itself remains, understandably and 
unsurprisingly, an unfi nished venture.24
24 Research supported by the Estonian Research Council (projects Diagrammatic Mind: Logical 
and Cognitive Aspects of Iconicity, PUT267, 2013–2015; Abduction in the Age of Fundamental 
Uncertainty, PUT1305, 2016–2018). I thank Kalevi Kull and Francesco Bellucci for comments 
and suggestions. Finally, one tidbit which may not be known but which concretely links Peirce 
to the University of Tartu in which Σημειωτική has been edited for over half a century: Julius 
(Th eodor) Isaac Faerber, who worked at Tartu as a lecturer in English in 1886–1892 (then the 
University of Dorpat), was Peirce’s student at Johns Hopkins University. Faerber, a graduate 
student in mathematics at the JHU, attended two of Peirce’s classes in the academic year 1883–
1884: on the fall semester he took “Th e Psychology of Great Men” and on the spring semester 
“Probabilities”. I dedicate this post-centennial issue to the memory of my teacher, colleague and 
friend Jaakko Hintikka, who passed away on 12 August 2015.
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Новые исследования знаков: комментарии и перспективы
Комментируются все четырнадцать статей, которые публикуются в настоящем 
спецвыпуске Sign Systems Studies, посвященном теории знаков Ч. С. Пирса. Прежде всего 
делается попытка соединить некоторые центральные темы и утверждения, помещая 
их в более широкий контекст пирсовской логики и философии. 
Uuemad märgiuuringud: kommentaare ja perspektiive
Käesolevas kommentaaris vastatakse neljateistkümnele artiklile, mis on avaldatud ajakirja Sign 
Systems Studies käesolevas Peirce’i märgiteooria erinumbris. Püütakse ühendada artiklites 
käsitletud keskseid teemasid ja väiteid ning asetada mõned nende põhipunktid Peirce’i loogika 
ja fi losoofi a avaramasse perspektiivi.
